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Abstract
This paper provides a discussion of the consequences of digital convergence on strategic
management. In order to show the multiple effects we follow a three-steps approach. First,
we investigate the implications on industry structure based on Porters concept of structural
analysis of industries. The second step investigates the implications on critical success fac-
tors. Finally, we analyze the consequences of digital convergence on the generic strategies.
This  analysis  reveals  major  conceptual  drawbacks  of  Porter’s  generic  strategies  in
INFOCOM. Therefore, we introduce the Dynamic Product Differentiation Strategy which
considers the implications of digital convergence and give a guidance for its successful im-
plementation.2
1  Introduction
On April 23, 1998 Siemens AG, Germany, launched a widely noticed press release. The
company plans to reorganize its organizational structure in the areas of information and
communication. This reorganization is driven by changes in the competitive environment
on the global market. Besides deregulation and privatization processes the main driver for
this drastic step has been the convergence of technologies. With the reorganization of its
information and communication divisions Siemens reacts to the growing importance of
these businesses. According to the press release the company earned 40 per cent of its total
turnover in these segments which amounts to 30 Billion Dollars in 1997 (Siemens, 1998).
As  shown  by  the  reaction  of  Siemens  and  other  multinational  companies  in  the
information  and  communication  industries,  digital  convergence  significantly  alters  the
way business is done. Consequently, traditional concepts of strategic management become
largely obsolete. Rather, innovative approaches need to be pursued in order to gain and
sustain a competitive edge in the increasingly heterogeneous and fluctuating environment
of these converging industries.
In this paper we analyze the consequences of digital convergence on strategic management
and its underlying assumptions. Additionally, we introduce a hybrid strategy which con-
siders possible implications of digital convergence.
2  Digital Convergence
In theory, the concept of digital convergence has been known for decades. Scientists of
various fields have predicted the coming of the digital revolution tried and to asses its
implications  on  industry  and  society  (Baldwin  &  McVoy  &  Steinfield,  1996;  Yoffie,
1997). However, it was not until a few years ago that digital convergence started to gain
practical importance. At that time, large numbers of high-performance digital components
were brought onto the market at relatively low costs which facilitated the rate of adoption
of these technologies in a variety of different products (Duysters & Hagedoorn, 1990 &
1997).  Today,  almost  every  single  electronic  device  incorporates  some  sort  of  digital
technology.  Consequently,  as  these  products  where  increasingly  equipped  with  digital
components,  boundaries  among  distinct  industry  became  ambiguous  and  lead  to
overlapping industries. The most vivid example is given by the information industry and
communications industry which form one industry (Chakravarthy, 1993 & 1994; OECD,
1992).
Although  extensively  discussed  in  theory  and  practice,  a  clear  definition  of  the  term
"convergence" does not exist. A widely accepted definition of convergence has been sug-
gested by Yoffie (1997, p. 3): "In its simplest form, convergence means the uniting of the
functions of the computer, the telephone, and the television set." An alternative definition
describes convergence as "the ability of different network platforms to carry essentially
similar kinds of services" (European Commission, 1997, p. 1). While the first definition is
one most often cited in popular press - it is easily understood - does the second represent a
more scientific approach toward this topic and, thus, is more frequently found in scientific
publications.  Finally,  Wegberg  (1995)  distinguishes  among  convergence  on  the  supply3
side and convergence on the demand side. "On the supply side, convergence means that ...
industries increasingly use the same knowledge base. On the demand side, convergence
means that market boundaries become fuzzier, both within the ... industries and between
them" (Wegberg, 1995, pp. 4-5).
Greenstein & Khanna (1997) suggest that there are two primary kinds of convergence:
convergence in substitutes and convergence in complements. According to the authors two
products converge in substitutes when customers consider two products to be interchange-
able with each other. This form of convergence occurs if different companies develop fea-
tures of their products that make them similar to certain other products. It also appears,
when companies develop standardized bundles of components to perform a certain range
of functions, e.g. a company merges a monitor, keyboard, central processing unit, and a
telephone to form a complete communication system. (Greenstein & Khanna, 1997)
Convergence  in  complements  is  when  two  products  work  better  and  more  efficient
together  than  separately.  It  occurs  when  different  companies  develop  standardized
products or systems that interact to form a larger system. In this case, the components
perform a combined function which none of them could do alone. The combination of
these  technologies  creates  a  service  that  did  not  exist  before.  Thus,  the  output  of  this
system can potentially be larger than the sum of the output of its parts. In both cases, the
products are often unrelated and start to converge in complements or substitutes over time.
An  example  for  convergence  in  complements  is  the  recent  large-scale  emergence  of
online-databases. These products unify two formerly distinct technologies: advanced on-
line  transaction  computing  technology  and  data  compression  methods  for
telecommunication (Greenstein & Khanna, 1997).
The trend towards digital convergence is determined by several major driving forces. Basi-
cally, the European Commission (1997) distinguishes among technology and deregulation.
Yoffie  (1997)  introduced  three  main  driving  forces:  1.  semiconductor,  software,  and
digital  communication  technologies;  2.  governmental  deregulation;  and  3.  managerial
creativity.  Some  of  these  drivers  have  been  well  understood  since  the  early  Seventies.
Especially,  digital  technology  was  assessed  as  a  major  driver  towards  convergence.
However, according to Yoffie it required the joint effort of all the three driving forces in
order for digital convergence to materialize (Yoffie, 1997).
Undoubtedly, the most important of these driving forces is the rapid progress in the field
of digital and related technologies. According to Moore’s law - named after Intel Corpora-
tion’s chairman, Gordon Moore - power and capacity of micro processors double approxi-
mately every eighteen months (Tapscott, 1996). Although the doubling cycle has now in-
creased up to two years, the underlying principle of Moore’s law is still valid: the costs of
increasing computer power are decreasing, hence, approaching almost zero. Together with
improved software, this rapid progress in micro electronics allows computers to perform a
growing range of functions at low costs. This has lead to the spreading of computer avail-
ability to millions of corporate and private users around the world (Yoffie, 1997). By 1997
about 25 per cent of German households use computers. Computer usage is even higher in
the  United  States  or  Scandinavian  countries  where  it  approaches  40  to  50  per  cent
(Fachverband Informationstechnik, 1997).4
Modest progress in the communication field hindered the movement towards convergence
in the early stages. Traditional devices for information interchange (e.g. copper wires) had
only limited capacity, which raised the costs of communication services. However, recently
developed communication technologies (e.g. fiber-optic cables) overcome this major tech-
nological backlog by allowing the transmission of large quantities of information at rela-
tively low costs (Yoffie, 1997).
Yet, improvements in communication technologies alone cannot lead to a major decline in
communication costs. Often, complicated regulatory schemes negatively influence the cost
structures  of  communication  service  providers.  In  some  cases  they  have  created
monopolies causing high communication costs. Thus, in addition to the advent of new
technologies  it  also  needed  a  process  of  deregulation  which  dramatically  reduced
telecommunication  costs.  This  process  was  triggered  by  the  breakup  of  AT&T  in  the
United States in 1984 (Yoffie, 1997). Also the European telecommunication markets have
moved from monopolized structures to markets facing full competition. By the beginning
of 1998 telecommunication services and infrastructures will be totally liberalized in most
member states of the EC. As a result, communication costs will ultimately continue to
decline all over the world (European Commission, 1997).
In  his  discussion  of  the  major  driving  forces  Yoffie  (1997)  stresses  the  importance  of
managerial  creativity  as  a  crucial  factor  to  create  convergence.  From  1970  to  1990
progress  in  computer  and  communication  technologies  did  not  lead  to  convergence,
because it happened  within  established  industry  boundaries.  Early  attempts  of  creating
convergence relied on conventional views of technology. Big global players like IBM and
Sony tried to force convergence to happen by means of mergers, acquisitions and alliances.
The  main  idea  was  to  create  innovate  core  competencies  by  merging  complementary
competencies through mutual learning processes (Hamel, 1990). However, these attempts
to create convergence failed in most cases. On the other hand, small start-up companies
have  followed  more  unconventional  ways  to  create  innovative  products  for  their  niche
markets  in  order  to  stay  competitive  against  established  players.  Thus,  managerial
creativity from these start-ups was a major driver towards digital convergence.
3  Strategic Implications of Digital Convergence
3.1  Implications on Industry Structure
Much has been published about strategic implications of digital convergence on industry
structure (e.g. Collis & Bane & Bradley, 1996). Most of these publications focus on corpo-
rate activities within the well-defined  boundaries  of  existing  industries,  rather  than  on
what happens between industry boundaries (Greenstein & Khanna, 1997). Thus, in this
paper, we follow an approach that incorporates both the  inter-industrial  and  the  intra-
industrial implications of digital convergence. This approach is based on Porter’s working
definition  of  an  industry  "...as  the  group  of  firms  producing  products  that  are  close
substitutes for each other." (Porter, 1998a, p. 5). It considers the fact that convergence
causes formerly distinct industries to form a mega-industry which Chakravarthy (1993 &
1994) calls "INFOCOM". This industry is illustrated by Figure 1.5
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Figure 1: Digital Convergence and INFOCOM
To  this  industry  we  apply  the  traditional  concept  of  structural  analysis  of  industries
(Porter, 1998a). According to this concept, the intensity of competition in an industry is
rooted  in  its  underlying  economic  structure.  This  structure  is  expressed  by  five  basic
competitive forces which determine the ultimate profit potential of the respective industry.
The five competitive forces are entry, threat of substitutes, bargaining power of buyers,
bargaining power of suppliers, and rivalry among current competitors (Porter, 1998a). In
this  chapter  we  will  examine  emerging  shifts  in  the  major  sources  of  each  of  these
competitive forces in order to assess the strategic implications of digital convergence on
industry structure.
New entrants can substantially threaten an industry’s profitability as they bring new capac-
ity, try to gain market share and often dispose of substantial resources (Porter, 1998a).
Thus, every industry tries to prevent new competitors from entering the market by erecting
barriers to entry (Yip, 1982). If these barriers are high, consequently, the threat of entry
will be low. Generally, digital convergence leads to a reduction of barriers to entry by
negatively affecting its major sources. Product differentiation, however, is not an effective
barrier anymore since products in the information and communication field are getting
more  and  more  homogenous  and,  hence,  substitutable.  Customers’  costs  for  switching
among  products  from  different  vendors  are  relatively  low.  Consequently,  brand
identification and customer loyalty are diminishing entailing the risk of new entrants. This
risk has become even more evident by the abrogation  of  government  regulation  of  the
telecommunication  markets.  Since  government  barriers  were  lifted  a  large  number  of
phone  and  cable  TV  companies  have  entered  these  growing  markets  threatening  the
market  position  of  established  competitors.  Finally,  know  how  differentiation  -
traditionally an effective barrier in technological industries - is beginning to deteriorate
due to an increasing rate of technology transfers among these industries through mergers,
acquisition and alliances.
Intensity of rivalry derives from one ore more competitors attempting to enhance the com-
petitive position within the existing industry. In most cases, competitive actions have sub-
stantial  effects  on  the  other  competitors  and,  hence,  cause  some  sort  of  competitive
reaction.  If  this  vicious  cycle  of  competitive  action  and  reaction  escalates,  it  can
undermine the profitability of the whole industry (Porter, 1998a). The overall effect of
digital  convergence  on  rivalry  among  current  competitors  is  supposed  to  be  of  an
indifferent  nature.  It  influences  some  sources  of  this  competitive  force  in  a  favorable,
others  in  an  unfavorable  way.  The  number  of  players  in  the  information  and6
telecommunication  industries  has  largely  increased  over  the  past  years,  due  to  lower
barriers to entry and deregulation. This leads to numerous competitors in these industries.
Additionally,  more  competitors  also  enlarge  industry  capacity  often  disrupting  the
supply/demand balance. Finally, as products in these industries become more and more
substitutable, companies increasingly need to compete on price.
These factors increase the likelihood of offensive actions of some competitors in order to
gain competitive advantages. As a result, the whole industry becomes unstable. The risk of
ruinous price battles in the information and communication industry is somewhat lowered
by the extraordinary growth these industries have been experiencing over  the  past  few
years.  According  to  the  European  Information  Technology  Observatory,  the  actual
worldwide volume of the information and communication market amounts to 1,5 Trillion
Dollars  with  an  estimated  growth  of  8,6  per  cent  for  the  next  two  years.  Thus,  every
competitor can improve its market position by growing with the market and not at the ex-
pense of the other competitors. Additionally, the process of convergence leads to an in-
creasing number of mergers, acquisitions and alliances (Wegberg, 1995) which reduces
the  intensity  of  rivalry.  According  to  statistics  provided  by  the  European  Commission
(1997) more than 15 per cent of worldwide mergers and acquisitions took place in the
information and communication industry. Thus, current players in this industry are trying
to coordinate their strategies resulting in reduced rivalry among them.
Substitute products are other products that can perform the same functions as the product
of the industry. Pressure from these products derives from their characteristic of placing a
ceiling on prices companies can charge their customers without loosing them to other in-
dustries and, hence, compromising the profitability of their own industry (Porter, 1998a).
Digital convergence increases the pressure from substitute products for various reasons.
Due to convergence, margins between distinct industries become fuzzier. Consequently,
some previously unrelated products become direct substitutes in demand. Examples  for
this effect are fax machines and computers (the latter equipped with a modem and fax
software)  as  well  as  television  and  multimedia  computers  (Wegberg,  1995).  Another
reason for the emerging trend towards a higher substitutability of converging products is
the increased similarity of these products in terms of physical appearance and features.
Every  new  generation  of  digital  products  grabs  more  features  from  related  products
rendering them easily interchangeable for customers (Yoffie, 1997).
Bargaining  power  of  buyers  may  threaten  an  industry’s  profitability  by  forcing  down
prices, demanding higher quality or more services, and playing competitors against each
other. The power of the major buyer groups of an industry depends on a number of market
characteristics (Porter, 1998a) which are influenced by digital convergence differently. In
all,  convergence  will  lead  to  an  increase  in  the  bargaining  power  of  buyers  of  the
concerned industry. One major cause is that converging information and communication
products are relatively undifferentiated. This lack of differentiation provides buyers with a
strong bargaining position as they can easily find alternative suppliers. Their position is
enhanced  by  generally  reduced  switching  costs  due  to  a  high  standardization  of
information  and  communication  technologies.  In  this  situation  the  price  becomes  the
primary  determinant  of  buying  patterns.  Customers  tend  to  be  very  price-sensitive
weakening the profitability of the respective industry.7
Additionally, converging products incorporate a growing number of features which were
originally  provided  by  a  large  number  of  distinct  products.  For  instance,  modern
computers already envelop adjacent businesses, from calculators to answering machines,
from  digital  video  and  audio  to  faxes.  As  a  large  variety  of  needs  is  served  by  one
convergent product (Yoffie, 1997) it  is  easier  for  buyers  to  gather  and  process  market
information  on  this  single  product  rather  than  on  multiple  products.  This  higher
information level usually yields a higher bargaining power to the buyer (Porter, 1998a).
Finally, the bargaining power of buyers is enhanced by the growing number of competitors
in  these  converging  industries  due  to  deregulation.  The  overall  trend  towards  raised
bargaining power of buyers is somewhat weakened by the  fragmented  structure  on  the
demand side of the market.  Predominantly,  buyers  in  this  market  only  purchase  small
portions of sales from the industry, which reduces the influence of single buyer groups on
the industry’s profitability.
Bargaining power of suppliers can be exerted by threatening to raise prices or reduce the
quality of an industry’s input factor. In this way suppliers can substantially reduce the
profitability of an industry (Porter, 1998a). Digital convergence is to a large extent based
on  semiconductor  and  other  types  of  digital  technology.  There’s  literally  no  electronic
appliance  anymore  that  doesn’t  incorporate  some  sort  of  microchip.  Hence,
semiconductors and microchips are an important input to the products of the information
and communication industry. They largely influence the strategic options companies in
this  industry  may  pursue.  This  characteristic  raises  the  bargaining  power  of  suppliers.
Additionally,  the  supplier  groups  for  this  type  of  input  factors  is  dominated  by  a  few
companies like Intel, Motorola, Siemens, Cyrix, and so forth. These suppliers are able to
exert considerable pressure on the industry in form of availability, prices, and quality, of
these crucial inputs. A similar concentration exists in the software market where Microsoft
has built a dominant position over the past 10 years and doesn’t hesitate to actively use the
bargaining power coming along with that position.
The  ongoing  trend  towards  mergers,  acquisitions  and  alliances  will  have  positive  and
negative  effects  on  supplier  power.  On  the  supply  side  it  will  raise  the  level  of
concentration of important supplier groups leading to an improved bargaining  position
over their buyers in the information and communication industry. On the demand side it
will  reduce  the  fragmentation  of  buyers  and,  hence,  reduce  the  bargaining  power  of
suppliers. Consequently, the overall impact of concentration on supplier’s power depends
on the ratio of the relative changes in concentration on those two sides. This competitive
force is further weakened by the large equality of those digital components that make them
relatively  substitutable.  Additionally,  the  information  and  communication  industry
represents a significant fraction of the total sales of these suppliers and, therefore, is an
important and therefore powerful customer. In summary the impact of digital convergence
on suppliers’ bargaining power is indifferent, as strengthening and weakening forces tend
to cancel each other in most cases.
The  collective  strength  of  these  five  competitive  forces  determines  the  intensity  of
competition within an industry and, hence, its profitability (Porter, 1998a). Due to digital
convergence  three  competitive  forces  are  supposed  to  increase  while  two  others  are
affected indifferently. This shift in the strengths of these five forces leads to an overall8
increase of competition in the information and communication industry. The fundamental
paradigm of the theory of industrial organization is "structure - conduct - performance"
(Mason, 1939; Caves, 1964). Following this paradigm we may infer that the profitability
of the industry will decline because of the accelerating trend towards digital convergence.
This severe competitive environment requires new critical success factors and alternative
forms of strategic behavior.
3.2  Implications on Critical Success Factors
Critical success factors are defined as factors that enable companies to gain a competitive
edge over their competitors. Thus, critical success factors largely determine a company’s
long term prosperity and growth. What kind of factors are critical for strategic success has
not been clearly defined yet. This is mainly due to conceptual deficiencies of research in
this area. Still, there is a large degree of consent regarding cost, quality, flexibility, and
time of being critical success factors (Kaluza, 1987; Fritz, 1997). Exploiting these critical
success factors creates strategic advantages for the respective company for a certain period
of time. Thus, a company needs to have at least one of these critical success factors in
order  to  survive  in  today’s  competition  (Henderson,  1984).  The  ongoing  process  of
converging products and industries affects most of these critical success factors  in  two
different ways: direct and indirect. Directly, digital convergence implies an alteration of
the  strategic  effectiveness  of  these  critical  success  factors  in  order  to  gain  competitive
advantage.  Indirectly,  it  causes  changes  in  the  competitive  environment  influencing
companies’ critical success factors. Thus, digital convergence exerts significant pressure
on companies to reconsider their competitive positions and the critical success factors in
which they are based.
Since the early Seventies costs have been considered as a crucial factor for long-term suc-
cess and prosperity (Wildemann, 1989; Porter, 1998a). Although some other major critical
success factors have been discovered since then, costs are still of major importance to stra-
tegic  management.  As  a  result,  most  modern  strategies  incorporate  costs  as  a  critical
success  factor  although  to  a  different  extent.  In  converging  industries,  however,  the
relative  importance  of  costs  has  decreased.  Industries  now  growing  together  were
originally separated. They had followed different historical paths  resulting  in  industry-
specific cost structures. These differences in cost structures allowed a clear distinction of
industries and their boundaries and represented a barrier to entry for new competitors.
However,  due  to  digital  convergence,  cost  structures  of  the  industries  involved  are
becoming more and more similar. This effect is due to the technological adjustments in the
converging industries. Both the information industry and the communication industry are
extensively using microelectronics and digital components as major input factors. As these
components are largely standardized, companies in both industries incur nearly the same
purchasing costs. Additionally, the same production equipment is required  to  assemble
these components. As a result, also production costs become similar. The tendency of the
decreasing importance of costs as a critical success factor is enforced by the steady decline
in  unit  cost  of  computer  power.  Due  to  rapid  progress  in  the  microelectronics  field
computer  power  has  become  virtually  free  (Yoffie,  1997).  Consequently,  in  related
industries it becomes extremely difficult to gain competitive advantage on the basis of low
costs for core components.9
However, in many cases the decrease in costs for this type of input is partly offset by a sig-
nificant increase in costs for acquiring know-how. In order to stay competitive in a con-
verging industry companies need to acquire know-how from other industries in which they
lack experience. Companies from the information industry need to achieve communication
expertise and vice versa. Generally, getting access to immaterial resources like know-how
requires substantial investments over a long period of time. Many companies try to lower
this cost burden by building strategic alliances or other forms of cooperations, which again
leads to an adjustment of the cost structures of the companies involved.
Another effect reducing the strategic relevance of costs is the modified experience curve,
described in Figure 2. Due to convergence, a variety of new technologies and functions is
incorporated into the production processes and products. As a result, cost advantages de-
riving from the traditional experience curve become partially obsolete. Rather, companies
move to a new experience curve that includes the old as well as the new technologies and
functions. This shift from one experience curve to another requires companies to develop a
new cost decreasing potential by moving along the new experience curve. Simultaneously,
all competitors are placed in a similar starting position. Therefore, it becomes extremely
difficult for one of these companies to gain new cost advantages over its competitors.
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Figure 2: Modified Experience Curve Effect
A second major critical success factor is quality. Generally, quality is defined as the degree
of customer satisfaction provided by a product or service (Wildemann, 1993). Quality con-
sists of two major sources: conceptual quality and production quality. Conceptual quality
describes to what extent customer needs are taken into consideration in the conceptual and
designing phase of a product or service. Production quality is defined as the transfer of
conceptual quality into product quality (Kaluza, 1989). Based on our definition of quality
as the degree of customer satisfaction we may identify two major implications of digital
convergence on quality as a critical success factor.
The first implication derives from the increased range of functions provided by products of
converging industries. For instance, convergence among the computer industry and the en-
tertainment business leads to the emergence of multimedia computers on a large scale. To-
day almost every computer shipped in the world has multimedia capabilities while in 199210
only 1 percent could provide these features (Yoffie, 1997). The range of different functions
provided by a single product, which allows for various types of customer needs to be satis-
fied,  in  turn  raises  the  degree  of  quality.  In  many  cases  these  products  also  provide
functions that directly result from the process of merging different technologies and know-
how, thus, increasing the quality of the product. From this implication we can infer, that
the process of digital convergence leads to an industry-wide increase in product quality by
providing customers with an extended range of different and partly unique features.
The second implication of digital convergence on quality deals with the process of stan-
dardization in the industries involved. As already mentioned, these industries rely heavily
on microelectronics and digital components as core input factors. These factors are charac-
terized by a high degree of standardization. As everyone in this industry uses the same
standardized  input,  a  certain  minimum  quality  level  becomes  implicitly  defined
throughout  the  whole  industry.  Usually,  this  minimum  quality  level  is  relatively  high.
Therefore, it becomes very difficult to compete solely on the basis of quality. Due to these
two major implications of digital convergence, quality is reduced from a critical success
factor  to  a  hygiene  factor.  A  high  level  of  quality  needs  to  be  maintained  for  staying
competitive, however, it cannot be used as the only source for gaining a competitive edge
in the INFOCOM industry.
The third significantly affected critical success factor is flexibility. In general, flexibility is
an important characteristic of companies enabling them to adapt to changes in their envi-
ronment quickly. In particular, it is a crucial factor for companies that operate in an eco-
nomic environment like INFOCOM that has become more and more complex, dynamic,
and unpredictable recently. In this case, flexibility significantly increases the probability of
survival  and  secures  long-term  economic  success.  Generally,  we  can  state  that  the
importance of flexibility as a major critical success factor is enhanced due to the process of
digital convergence for two major reasons: first, an increased demand for flexibility and
second,  a  higher  potential  of  flexibility  within  converging  industries.  In  the  following
discussion  of  flexibility  and  convergence  we  distinguish  among  organizational  and
technological flexibility.
As previously mentioned, digital convergence implies an increase in the range of products,
markets,  and  competing  companies.  These  implications  of  convergence  require  a  high
level  of  technological  flexibility.  Converging  industries  entail  the  merger  of  different
technologies. Companies, therefore, need to get acquainted with these new technologies
and have to incorporate them into their existing technological production environment.
Combining  established  and  new  technologies  requires  at  least  a  minimum  degree  of
compatibility among them. Finally, companies also need to have flexible input factors in
order to meet an increased variety of customer needs in the INFOCOM industry.
In  addition  to  technological  flexibility  we  identified  an  increased  demand  for
organizational  flexibility.  Changes  in  the  technological  environment  require
complementary know-how. Acquisition and integration of this know-how into the existing
organization represent a major challenge. Often this integration process involves changes
in the organizational structure and processes. In summary, on the one hand the demand
for  flexibility  increases  due  to  convergence.  On  the  other  hand,  convergence  provides
companies  with  a  high  potential  of  flexibility.  Modern  computer-integrated  production11
technologies  are  capable  of  producing  a  wide  range  of  products  only  with  a  minimal
amount  of  physical  setups.  Furthermore,  products  of  INFOCOM  are  of  a  digital  and
modular nature. They can easily be varied by adding/removing components or changing
the programming. A widely seen consequence of digital convergence is a growing number
of mergers and alliances. These forms of inter-organization cooperation aim at the mutual
interchange of intangible resources like know-how. Thus, they increase the potential of
organizational flexibility of the companies involved. From these implications on flexibility
we  infer  that  rather  than  costs  and  quality,  the  importance  of  flexibility  as  a  critical
success factor is enhanced due to digital convergence. Thus,  an  active  management  of
flexibility becomes crucial for a company’s long-term success in the INFOCOM industry.
In today’s competition time becomes an increasingly important factor for long-term eco-
nomic success (Stalk & Hout, 1990). This shift in importance is mainly due to the contra-
dictory development of the two major components of time companies of every industry
have  to  deal  with:  time  to  market  and  time  on  market.  While  the  time  to  market  for
products has significantly increased over the past decades, their average time of presence
on the market has shortened dramatically. This development requires companies to ac-
tively manage time as a critical success factor.
Due to digital convergence, the already substantial gap between time to market and time
on market has increased. In both the information industry and the communication industry
innovations are of major strategic importance resulting in very short innovation cycles.
This  phenomenon  particularly  applies  to  the  information  industry.  As  these  industries
converge their innovation cycles overleap forming a new cycle with an extremely short
meantime  between  innovations.  Thus,  the  pace  at  which  existing  products  and
technologies are continually replaced by new ones is increasing, significantly reducing the
time products are exposed to customers. If this replacement rate exceeds a certain level a
phenomenon occurs which is referred to as „leap frogging“. This  terminus  describes  a
special  form  of  consumer  behavior  often  observed  in  high-technology  industries.
Consumers do not follow each and every technological leap but start to leave out one or
even  two  leaps  before  they  switch  to  a  new  product.  However,  this  behavior  is  not
appropriate for companies operating in this business. As patterns of leap frogging differ
from customer to customer, companies are forced to follow every technological leap in the
industry.
The strategic position of INFOCOM companies is aggravated by the fact that time and
costs for research and development are mostly unaffected by convergence. In this severe
economic environment the management of time becomes crucial. Becoming a pioneer puts
a company in the favorable position of being able to provide customer with solutions that
incorporate the latest state of engineering. Thus, fast reactions to shifts in customer needs
and  technological  advancements  allow  a  company  to  realize  economies  of  speed,  as
customers are willing to honor fast reaction with higher prices. Furthermore, being the
first  on  the  market  with  an  innovative  product  creates  a  temporary  monopoly.  In  this
market situation the pioneering company is relatively free to set adequate prices in order to
recover  the  usually  considerable  costs  for  research  and  development.  Once  other
companies come up with similar products prices drop immediately, due to the increased
competition. In this situation, it becomes much more difficult to amortize investments in12
research  and  development.  Finally,  being  innovative  creates  a  positive  image  among
customers  and,  therefore,  strengthens  the  competitive  position  of  a  company  in  the
marketplace.
While  the  previously  discussed  implications  of  digital  convergence  on  major  critical
success factors were of a direct nature, a brief outline of indirect implications is given now.
The indirect implications result from an alteration of competitive forces in an industry
(refer to  chapter  3.1)  and,  therefore,  of  the  economic  situation  and  profitability  of  the
industry as a whole. According to Porter’s model (1998a), increased bargaining power of
suppliers observed in INFOCOM leads to increased costs for major input factors, exerting
heavy pressure on the critical success factor costs. The also enhanced bargaining power of
customers requires companies to consider customer needs to a larger extent. Therefore,
they need to have a relatively high minimum level regarding the critical success factors
costs, quality, flexibility, and time. Basically, the same effect derives from the increased
rivalry  of  existing  competitors  within  the  INFOCOM  industry.  The  severe  competitive
situation is even enhanced, as the higher probability of new entrants increases the demand
for low costs, flexibility, and economies of time. Finally, digital convergence implies an
increased threat of substitutes. Thus, companies need to improve their cost and quality
position in order to stay competitive.
In the previous paragraphs we showed that digital convergence triggers direct and indirect
shifts in the strategic importance of major critical success factors. While costs and quality
experience a major decrease in strategic importance, flexibility and time are substantially
enhanced.  This,  again,  has  significant  consequences  on  Porter’s  widely  used  generic
strategies.
3.3  Implications on Generic Strategies
Porter suggested three fundamentally different routes to sustainable competitive advantage
which have gained widespread acceptance over the past twenty years. The cost leadership
and differentiation strategies aim at a competitive advantage in the whole industry. Focus
strategies, however, seek to achieve a cost advantage or differentiation advantage in a nar-
row segment of the market. The underlying notion of this concept is that companies in
order to gain competitive advantage, are required to make a clear choice about the path
towards this competitive advantage. Otherwise, they risk to be caught in a position which
Porter calls „stuck in the middle“, characterized by below average performance and low
profitability (Porter, 1998b).
Overall cost leadership aims at gaining a considerable cost advantage within the industry.
It became widely used in the Seventies, when the experience curve concept was popular.
Successfully  pursuing  this  strategy  requires  aggressive  construction  of  efficient-scale
facilities,  realizing  cost  reductions  from  the  experience  curve  concept,  tight  cost  and
overhead control, avoidance of marginal customers, and consequent cost minimization in
indirect  areas  like  R&D,  marketing,  finance,  and  so  forth  (Porter,  1998a).  Low  cost
become  the  main  goal  where  every  major  decision  is  verified  upon.  Still,  other  major
critical  success  factors  and  other  functional  areas  cannot  be  totally  ignored,  but  are
considered at a minimum level. Consequently, the competitive edge deriving from this13
strategy is the ability to offer products at prices that go beyond those of competitors. A cost
leader can acquire a substantial market share and a dominant position in the industry.
However,  this  strategy  is  highly  susceptible  to  technological  leaps  which  nullify
advantages from the experience curve. Furthermore, it requires one company to be the cost
leader,  not  several  firms  vying  for  this  position  (Porter,  1998b).  Additionally,  cost
leadership can only be achieved in a market for homogeneous products, where the price
represents the main purchasing criteria.
These prerequisites of the overall cost leadership strategy are largely undermined by the
process of digital convergence. At a first glance it may be easier to achieve a large absolute
market share in a mega-industry like INFOCOM with a substantial market volume. How-
ever, this most important prerequisite for cost leadership becomes rather difficult to gain
due to the also increased number of competitors in this industry and the higher probability
of new entrants from adjacent industries. The approach to gain these strategic cost advan-
tages from implementing innovative production technologies cannot be considered effec-
tive anymore. Usually a large number of competitors has access to them because of the
high degree of intra- and inter-industrial cooperation observed in the INFOCOM industry.
This development also heavily influences the strategic implications from the experience
curve concept. This concept becomes largely  obsolete  for  strategic  management  due  to
frequent  leaps  from  one  experience  curve  to  another  (through  technological  break-
throughs) canceling already gained cost advantages deriving from this concept. It puts all
competitors  in  a  similar  or  even  equal  position  on  the  new  experience  curve,  thus
rendering it very difficult to gain  a  leading  position.  Additionally,  digital  convergence
causes another inherent risk of cost leadership to materialize. Homogenous markets and
products do not exist in the information and communication industry anymore. Rather,
products are to an increasing extent differentiated in order to satisfy a wide range of cus-
tomer needs. As a result, they become more and more heterogeneous in terms of product
technologies but also production technologies. In this situation, cost-effective large-scale
production  of  a  homogenous  product  designed  for  mass  markets  does  not  represent  a
strategic option in today’s markets.
Another effect coming along with highly differentiated products is the reduced importance
of the price as a purchasing criteria. As differentiated products serve an increasing range
of needs, customers are willing to value this increased customer focus by paying higher
prices. Thus, price is not the main purchasing criteria anymore, but devalued to a hygiene
factor which has only marginal influence on  customer  behavior,  as  long  as  it  remains
within  a  certain  bandwidth.  This  deteriorated  impact  of  prices  on  purchasing  patterns
significantly weakens the position of a company pursuing a cost leadership strategy. The
last statement  is  significant  for  the  overall  implications  of  digital  convergence  on  this
generic strategy and, thus, directly leads over to the conclusion drawn from the analysis:
Porter’s  generic  strategy  of  overall  cost  leadership  is  largely  undermined  by  digital
convergence. This is due to the fact, that the critical success factor, this strategy is solely
based  upon,  experiences  heavy  pressure  from  the  changes  in  converging  industries.
Basically, Porter’s one-dimensional „cookbook approach“ towards cost leadership worked
well in mass markets with homogenous products and clearly defined boundaries. However,
its  strategic  validity  becomes  highly  questionable  in  a  multi-dimensional  economic14
environment where strategic success cannot be gained by solely focusing on one critical
success factor but requires more factors to be taken into consideration simultaneously.
Porter’s alternative generic strategy to long-term economic success is differentiation. Ac-
cording to this strategy a company needs to differentiate its products or services in order to
create something that is perceived as being unique by customers throughout the whole in-
dustry.  Approaches  towards  creating  such  a  unique  position  may  be  design  or  brand
image, technology, features, customer service, dealer network, etc. By providing customers
with unique benefits that go beyond  a  product’s  base  functions,  a  company  can  create
customer loyalty. It provides insulation against competitive rivalry and significantly lowers
customers’ price sensitivity. Thus, differentiation yields higher margins avoiding the need
for a low-cost position and establishing entry barriers (Porter, 1998a). A firm that can
achieve and sustain a certain degree of differentiation will perform above average in its in-
dustry, as long as the price premium exceeds the extra costs incurred for differentiating its
products  (Porter,  1998b).  Differentiation  can  be  pursued  successfully  with  high-quality
products or products that address specific customer needs. It usually precludes gaining a
high market share, as it requires a perception of exclusivity, which is incompatible with a
high market share. It also incorporates a trade-off with a low-cost position as it requires
costly  investments  in  extensive  research,  product  design,  high  quality  materials  and
marketing campaigns. There is wide consent that this high-cost position represents the
"Archilles’ heel" of the differentiation strategy. Other inherent risks are imitating products
launched by competitors, high fluctuations in customer needs, decreasing demand for the
differentiated factors of a product, and too high increases in costs. Because of the latter
risk a company pursuing this strategy cannot totally ignore its cost position, but needs to
reduce costs in all areas that do not affect its differentiated position (Porter, 1998a).
Similar to a cost leader, a differentiator experiences significant strategic consequences due
to alterations of the strategy’s underlying factors and variables by digital convergence. As
mentioned before, the differentiation strategy aims at creating uniqueness by providing
high quality, service, and being responsive to customer needs. The potential of quality to
create something that is perceived unique throughout the industry is increasingly deterio-
rating in converging industries. Both, the information and the communication industry are
highly standardized in terms of input factors and production technologies. This results in
an industry-wide high level of quality, which makes it almost impossible for a company to
distinguish itself from competitors. Customers consider this high quality level of being a
matter of course rather than something exclusive and are not willing to pay a premium
price for it. They tend to react negatively, if a product’s quality goes below the implicit
standard  of  the  industry.  Therefore,  high  quality  only  represents  a  hygiene  factor  that
needs to be provided in order to stay competitive, but is no guarantor for above-average
returns anymore.
Similar  implications  emerge  for  service,  which  is  the  second  critical  success  factor  of
differentiation.  Providing  customers  with  a  special  service  is  an  increasingly  applied
approach  in  converging  industries.  In  this  way  companies  with  an  unfavorable  cost
structure try to create customer loyalty which insulates them against price-fights. However,
the more firms follow this approach, the less effective special customer service becomes as
a  dimension  of  differentiation.  Rather,  it  becomes  a  key  for  survival  in  a  converging15
environment. At a first glance, an effective factor of differentiation in INFOCOM seems to
be responsiveness to customer needs by offering a wide range of product variances. This
may  be  inferred  from  the  high  degree  of  standardization  that  characterizes  this  newly
formed industry. However, standardization of input factors and components comes along
with an industry-wide concept of modular assembly. Together with an easily adaptable
software, this concept enables companies to offer an almost endless number of variances of
a  product.  Consequently,  products  in  INFOCOM  are  usually  highly  customized  to  the
needs  of  particular  customers.  Additionally,  all  competitors  have  access  to  these
standardized input factors, increasing the probability of imitations to a unique product.
Therefore,  gaining  a  differentiation  advantage  becomes  very  unlikely,  and  cannot  be
sustained over a longer period of time. The last statement becomes even more important if
we  consider  the  significantly  increased  fluctuations  in  customer  needs  and  preferences
observed during the last few years. Finally, due to the improved technical possibilities for
differentiation,  every  company  in  INFOCOM  is  theoretically  capable  of  providing
customers  with  multiple  benefits.  This  leads  directly  to  a  further  splitting  of  already
existing  customer  groups.  The  resulting  high  level  of  market  segmentation  is  another
reason why it becomes nearly impossible for a company to uniquely position itself in the
whole INFOCOM industry.
Finally, focus is a generic strategy that concentrates a company’s efforts on a particular
buyer group, segment of the product line, or geographic market. In contrast to overall cost
leadership and overall differentiation, the focus strategy aims at serving a particular, nar-
row-defined target group. This focus enables a company to act more effectively or effi-
ciently than competitors operating in the broad market. Companies pursuing this strategy
gain a competitive advantage by either better meeting the needs of the particular target
market, or lower costs in serving this market, or both. As a result, they have the potential
of earning above-average returns (Porter, 1998a). In view of digital convergence the major
drawback of this strategy is that it is highly vulnerable to changes in the market structure,
that is an increasing degree of segmentation. Once market segmentation exceeds a certain
level, the resulting strategic targets for focus become too narrow to be served in an eco-
nomic  way.  In  this  case,  focus  is  able  to  provide  neither  above-average  returns  nor
defenses against the competitive forces.
The  core  paradigm  of  Porter’s  generic  strategies  is  the  trade-off  between  a  low-cost
position  and  differentiation.  However,  in  many  cases  this  strict  separation  of  cost
leadership  and  differentiation  has  been  falsified  by  academic  research  and  empirical
studies. For this reason, in a recent article, Porter (1996) tries to justify his concept by
introducing a "productivity frontier". This frontier is defined as "...the sum of all existing
best  practices  at  any  given  time"  (Porter,  1996,  p.  62).  Below  this  frontier,  it  is  now
possible for a company to improve its  cost  and  differentiation  position  simultaneously.
However,  along  this  frontier,  the  trade-off  between  these  two  positions  still  exists.
Improving the cost position can only be effected to the debit of the differentiation position
and  vice  versa.  This  productivity  frontier  is  shifted  upwards  by  new  technologies,
enlarging the "hybrid area" below the frontier. In contrast to Porter (1996, p. 78), we do
not expect this productivity margin to be shifted but altered in its shape. Additionally, the
emerging  of  new  technologies  and  digital  convergence  defines  a  new  framework  for
strategic management as it significantly alters its underlying assumptions and variables.16
These actual trends are not yet included in Porter’s concept of generic strategies. However,
they provide companies with a high potential to perform above-average by pursuing hybrid
strategies.
4  Dynamic Product Differentiation Strategy as Strategic Response
to Digital Convergence
4.1  The Concept of Dynamic Product Differentiation
In  1987  Bernd  Kaluza  introduced  the  concept  of  Dynamic  Product  Differentiation
Strategy. It is designed as the strategic response to today’s heavily fluctuating markets and
customer needs. This strategy stresses the notion of high flexibility, companies need to
achieve and maintain in order to adopt immediately to those fluctuations over time. Thus,
unlike many others, the Dynamic Product Differentiation Strategy is of a dynamic rather
than static nature.
Originally, the Dynamic Product Differentiation Strategy derived from the concept of the
three generic strategies. This concept - developed by Michael E. Porter - has significantly
influenced the field of strategic management over the past two decades. In his concept,
Porter  distinguishes  three  basic  strategies  that  are  highly  correlated  with  long  term
success:  cost  leadership,  differentiation,  and  focus.  The  strategic  implication  from  this
notion  is  the  strict  separation  cost  benefits  and  differentiation  benefits.  According  to
Porter,  companies  need  to  make  a  clear  decision  whether  to  pursue  a  strategy  of  cost
leadership or a differentiation strategy. If they fail to do so, they run the risk of getting
moved into a strategically unfavorable situation which Porter calls "stuck in the middle"
(Porter, 1998b).
Although widely accepted in the academic world and extensively applied in the economic
field, the three generic strategies suffer from three major conceptual drawbacks.  These
drawbacks have caused an increasing amount of criticism especially in the last few years
(Kaluza, 1996).
1.  Porter’s generic strategies are of a static nature. They focus on achieving a high level
of differentiation or a favorable cost position at one certain point in time. They do not
consider  possible  changes  in  this  positions  over  time.  However,  in  reality  these
strategic positions are repeatedly redefined by the markets and, hence, highly dynamic.
In his paper "Towards a Dynamic Theory of Strategy" Porter (1991) tries to overcome
this conceptual lack of its generic strategies.
2.  The core paradigm of Porter’s concept has been falsified by a series of empirical inves-
tigations (Hall, 1980; White, 1986; Miller & Friesen, 1986). They proved that success-
ful companies gain a competitive edge over their competitors by improving both, their
cost and differentiation position.
3.  The  generic  strategies  do  not  account  for  the  strategic  implications  of  modern
manufacturing technologies and concepts as well as information and communication
technologies (Kaluza & Blecker & Sonnenschein, 1996). However, these new concepts17
allow  companies  to  simultaneously  increase  their  flexibility  and  to  lower  their
manufacturing  costs.  Thus,  implementing  modern  manufacturing  technologies  and
concepts is a common way to improve a company’s strategic position in both ways.
In order to overcome these drawbacks, a series of new strategies has been developed over
the past ten years. Most of them are hybrid strategies, focusing on achieving a high level
of differentiation while improving the cost position at the same time.
One  of  these  strategies  is  Kaluza’s  Dynamic  Product  Differentiation  Strategy.  This
strategy focuses on four critical success factors: costs, differentiation, flexibility, and time.
Additionally, it considers service and a broad variety of products as being relevant for
strategic success. These critical success factors provide a company with the capability to
meet changes in customer needs at low costs over a prolonged period of time. Figure 3
illustrates that a company pursuing the Dynamic Product Differentiation Strategy will try
to  simultaneously  produce  its  products  at  relatively  low  costs  and  a  high  level  of
differentiation.
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Figure 3: Dynamic Product Differentiation Strategy
(Kaluza, 1987)
Achieving this favorable strategic position in the upper right quadrant is effected by simul-
taneously focusing on the four major critical success factors. Together, they provide a com-
pany with the potential to react to changes in customers needs in a costly, fast and high-
quality manner.
Flexibility is the core factor. The strategy focuses on improving the process of switching
from one product to another according to changes in customer needs. This can be achieved
by using flexible technologies in the production area as well as in any other functional area
of a company. Generally, these technologies have the potential to substantially increase the
pace of the change process.18
Time  is  the  second  major  critical  success  factor.  In  today’s  dynamic  economic
environment customer needs are often highly volatile. Thus, for successfully pursuing the
Dynamic Product Differentiation Strategy, fast reaction to major shifts on the demand side
of the market becomes crucial. The resulting time advantages provide differentiation that
is rather difficult to imitate and provides above-average returns.
Low costs are still of major importance for a Dynamic Product Differentiator. However, in
this  case  cost  reductions  cannot  be  gained  by  following  the  path  on  the  tradition
experience curve. Rather,  costs  are  reduced  by  realizing  a  so-called  "learning-curve  of
change" (Wildemann, 1986).
Today, customers expect to be provided with solution to their individual problems rather
than generic products. Therefore, according to Kaluza, differentiation is provided not only
by  high  product  quality,  but  also  by  high  service  quality,  a  large  variety  of  products,
tailored solutions for individual customers, and a high pace of change.
4.2  Effectiveness of Dynamic Product Differentiation in Con-
verging Industries
The last section showed the limitations of Porter’s generic strategies in the dynamic envi-
ronment  of  converging  industries.  These  limitations  lead  to  a  significantly  lowered
probability of success of these strategies. In our opinion, there are two reasons for this
phenomenon. The first reason is Porter’s postulated trade-off between a low-cost position
and differentiation. This restriction significantly hinders companies in being successful in
a market that requires them to be effective and efficient in both areas. The second reason is
that Porter’s generic strategies  are  relatively  static  concepts.  They  do  not  represent  an
adequate framework for the dynamic and even highly fluctuating economic environment of
converging industries. These two major drawbacks require companies in the INFOCOM
industry to search for alternative approaches to strategic management.
The most promising approach is to pursue hybrid strategies. The term "hybrid" originates
from the Greek language meaning "putting different things together" or  "coming  from
crossbreeding".  In  this  sense,  hybrid  strategies  aim  at  gaining  a  competitive  edge  by
achieving both a low-cost position and differentiation (Fleck, 1995). Thus, these strategies
do not consider Porter’s "stuck in the middle" position of being unprofitable. Rather, they
stress the notion of a high profitability associated with this position. The strategic implica-
tions  from  this  view  make  hybrid  strategies  perform  outstandingly  in  converging
industries. Typical hybrid strategies are the Outpacing Strategies (Gilbert & Strebel, 1987
& 1991; Kleinaltenkamp, 1987), the Mass Customization (Pine, 1993), and the Dynamic
Product Differentiation Strategy (Kaluza, 1989). While the Outpacing Strategies and the
Mass Customization aim at gaining a competitive edge by improving the cost position and
the  differentiation  position  sequentially,  the  Dynamic  Product  Differentiation  Strategy
calls  for  improving  both  positions  simultaneously.  Thus,  it  entirely  condemns  Porter’s
trade-off between a low-cost position and differentiation.
The Dynamic Product Differentiation Strategy emphasizes the notion of achieving long-
term success by simultaneously focusing on a broad range of critical success factors rather19
than striving either for cost-leadership or differentiation. Thus, it is especially tailored for
complex  and  dynamic  industries  like  INFOCOM.  In  these  industries  companies  are
required to respond to changes in customer needs in a fast and cost-effective manner by
still providing a high level of quality. The core functional area for achieving the necessary
amount  of  flexibility  is  the  production/operations  area.  According  to  Kaluza,  this
flexibility can only be achieved by using the potential of modern production technologies
as well as information and communication technologies on the shop floor and in adjacent
areas.  It  also  requires  modern  approaches  to  leadership  and  production/operations
management to convert this potential into strategic success based on four critical success
factors: flexibility, time, low costs, and differentiation.
In fluctuating industries like INFOCOM the main critical factors are flexibility and time.
Traditional factors like low costs and differentiation are of minor importance to long-term
success.  The  Dynamic  Product  Differentiation  Strategy  deviates  from  the  traditional
interpretation of these two success factors because it views them in a dynamic rather than
static way. It defines a low-cost position as incurring low costs for switching from one
product to another or in other words, for leaping from one experience curve to another.
Similarly, differentiation is defined as optimally serving changing customer needs over
time rather than serving particular needs at a certain point in time. Therefore, also a low-
cost position and differentiation gain strategic importance because they correspond to the
ever increasing pace of change observed in converging industries.
Chapter 3 examined the effectiveness of Porter’s generic strategies in providing a company
with a position in the industry where it can defend itself against the five competitive forces
or even influence them in its favor. In the course of this examination we found that these
strategies, although valid for more than twenty-five years, have experienced a considerable
deterioration of their impact on today’s competitive environment. From this increased lack
of strategic relevance the need for new approaches to strategic management is apparent.
Therefore,  we  suggested  the  Dynamic  Product  Differentiation  Strategy  as  the  most
promising  alternative  for  converging  industries.  In  order  to  make  the  conceptual
differences and strategic implications between Porter’s generic strategies and the Dynamic
Product  Differentiation  Strategy  clear,  the  same  analysis  tool  is  applied  to  Kaluza’s
strategy as to Porter’s generic strategies. Based on the structural analysis of industries we
will  show  the  potential  of  the  Dynamic  Product  Differentiation  Strategy  to  protect  a
company against the five forces or providing it with a competitive edge by altering them.
In converging industries companies face an increasing threat of new competitors entering
the industry. This is mainly due to blurred industry boundaries and a closer similarity of
products.  The  Dynamic  Product  Differentiation  Strategy  provides  an  effective  shield
against new competitors  for  various  reasons.  A  company  pursuing  this  hybrid  strategy
competes  on  flexibility.  The  main  goal  is  to  achieve  a  position  of  a  change  master,
anticipating shifts in customer needs and, serving them fast. In case of an industry-wide
leap from one experience curve to  another  the  Dynamic  Product  Differentiator  will  be
capable of realizing a time lead before its competitors. Additionally, this time lead also
provides an effective barrier to entry for potential competitors, although limited in time.
This fast reaction to fluctuations in customer needs also represents something unique in
the industry differentiating a company’s products. Over time this dynamic differentiation20
creates  switching  costs  for  buyers  in  the  form  of  opportunity  costs.  In  addition  to
traditional switching costs as defined by Porter, a company switching from a Dynamic
Product Differentiator to another supplier incurs costs for not being served in this fast,
cost-effective and still high-quality manner. While traditional switching costs are of minor
significance in converging industries, these alternative switching costs create an effective
barrier to entry. This requires potential competitors to offer a major improvement in terms
of flexibility and time, which may be very difficult to achieve.
Similar to the threat of entry the process of convergence increases the intensity of rivalry
among  existing  competitors.  Since  traditional  barriers  to  entry  were  mostly  lifted,  the
number  of  players  in  INFOCOM  has  increased  dramatically.  In  conjunction  to  the
significantly  reduced  possibilities  of  differentiation  this  high  intensity  of  rivalry  forces
companies to compete mainly on the basis of prices, advertising and so forth. A Dynamic
Product Differentiator, however, is in the position to avoid these unprofitable price battles.
Rather, competition will be settled based on the critical success factors flexibility and time
in  order  to  achieve  dynamic  differentiation.  Similar  to  traditional  differentiation,  it
provides protection against intensive rivalry because of brand loyalty and a resulting low
price sensitiveness of customers. Even in the unlikely case the company gets involved in
the price competition, the Dynamic Product  Differentiation  Strategy  provides  it  with  a
solid  competitive  basis.  Besides  flexibility,  time,  and  quality  the  strategy  also  aims  at
reducing  switching  costs  in  the  production/operations  area.  As  these  costs  represent  a
significant fraction of the total costs incurred in modern manufacturing companies, their
cost position is influenced in a favorable manner.
Generally, pressure from substitute products is supposed to increase in the course of digital
convergence. Products from the industries involved in this process are becoming more and
more similar in terms of physical appearance, functionality, and quality. Consequently, the
price  ceiling  companies  can  ask  for  their  products  is  further  lowered.  The  Dynamic
Product Differentiation Strategy provides a solution to this dilemma. High flexibility and
fast reaction create a differentiation  advantage  by  providing  customers  with  something
new  and  innovative.  As  this  form  of  differentiation  tends  to  be  highly  honored  by
customers in today’s fluctuating markets, a Dynamic Product Differentiator is usually in
the position to lift the price ceiling back to an adequate level without losing customers to
substitute products. Additionally, the critical success factor time provides a company with
a  pioneering  position  and  therefore,  with  a  temporary  protection  against  substitute
products.  Theoretically,  the  Dynamic  Product  Differentiation  Strategy  provides  even
absolute  insulation  against  imitations,  as  each  product  is  assembled  to  the  needs  of  a
particular  customer.  As  these  particular  needs  only  exist  once,  traditional  imitation
becomes virtually impossible. Competitors can only try to imitate the capabilities leading
to this form of differentiation.
Another effect resulting from digital convergence is an increased bargaining power of buy-
ers.  The  conditions  making  them  so  powerful  have  already  been  discussed:
undifferentiated  products,  a  growing  number  of  competitors,  and  consequently,  price
competition.  This  increase  in  buyers’  bargaining  power  can  be  offset  by  the  Dynamic
Product Differentiation Strategy. Only a company pursuing this strategy can dispose of the
necessary high amount of flexibility to meet fluctuating customer needs in a fast and still21
cost-effective  manner.  Therefore,  buyers’  alternatives  to  switch  from  one  supplier  to
another are limited. In this case also their bargaining power decreases significantly. This
effect is even enforced, if their business is heavily dependent on fast reaction of suppliers
to shifts in demand.
The impact of convergence on the bargaining power of suppliers is more or less of an
indifferent nature. We could not observe a clear pattern of influence for this competitive
force. However, we definitely know that a Dynamic Product Differentiator can achieve a
significant  reduction  of  suppliers’  bargaining  power.  The  basis  for  this  capability  is
modern manufacturing and information technologies this strategy is largely based upon.
These technologies significantly reduce a company’s costs for switching among different
sources of supply, weakening the bargaining position of its suppliers.
This strategic effectiveness of the Dynamic Product Differentiation Strategy in converging
industries is the result of a variety of operational steps that need to be implemented within
the entire organization. Thus, the Dynamic Product Differentiation Strategy is not just an-
other way of differentiating itself from competitors. Rather, it is a new way of thinking
that needs to be reflected by a company’s structure and culture. Implemented effectively,
this strategy leads to the strong strategic position of  a  "change  master"  (Moss  Kanter,
1985) which provides a company with a substantial competitive edge in today’s dynamic
marketplace.
4.3  Implementation of the Dynamic Product Differentiation
Strategy
We already emphasized the importance of the production/operations area as the core func-
tional area for successfully pursuing the Dynamic Product Differentiation Strategy. Now,
an analysis of which concrete steps are needed in order to acquire the necessary excellence
in this area will be conducted. The implementation process, illustrated by Figure 4, needs
to  address  three  major  issues:  technology,  organization,  and  human  resources  as  they
represent the basis for reducing costs, increasing differentiation and enhancing flexibility.22
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Figure 4: Implementation of the Dynamic Product Differentiation Strategy
(Kaluza, 1996, modified)
Unlike  in  the  area  of  mass  production  twenty  years  ago,  today  a  growing  number  of
customers demands manufacturing companies to produce individual products which serve
their specific needs. Manufacturers can only meet this demand by taking  advantage  of
modern production technologies as well as information and communication technologies
(Kaluza, 1996 & 1998). Modern production technologies include machine tools based on
Numerical Control (NC), Computerized Numerical Control (CNC), and Direct Numerical
Control  (DNC).  NC  appliances  are  controlled  by  the  input  of  numerical  data.  This
approach already leads to a significant increase in flexibility on the shop-floor as setup
times and lead times are significantly reduced. However, in most cases NC machines have
been replaced by CNC-tools, which are controlled by a central micro-computer or mini-
computer, providing an even higher potential to shift among different products in a fast
and cost-effective manner. Current machines in this field are DNC- tools which can be
controlled  by  a  single  central  computer  in  a  large  number.  These  modern  production
technologies combine the benefits of a job shop and a continuous flow production.
The second type of technologies increasingly used in manufacturing companies is informa-
tion and communication technologies (Kaluza, 1996 & 1998). These technologies include
Computer-Aided  Design  (CAD),  Computer-Aided  Planning  (CAP),  Computer-Aided
Manufacturing (CAM), and Computer-Aided Quality Assurance (CAQ). CAD and CAM
have the highest impact on the critical success factors flexibility and time.  In  general,
CAD significantly reduces lead time in R&D. Additionally, it allows a company to re-
design  its  products  according  to  the  needs  of  a  particular  customer  quickly.  This
computerized  adoption  process  is  very  cost-effective  and  provides  a  high  quality  of
innovate products. Similarly, CAM increases the flexibility in the production/operations
area. Connected to CAD and CAP, data from R&D can immediately flow into production
control. Physical setup activities on the shop floor are reduced to a minimum, resulting in
low setup times and lead times. In the following production process CAQ significantly
enhances  product  and  production  quality.  Therefore,  these  systems  support  the23
simultaneous achievement of the critical success factors costs, quality, flexibility, and time.
This potential is significantly enhanced by integrating these technologies into Computer
Integrated Manufacturing (CIM).
Generally, the Dynamic Product Differentiation Strategy requires organizational concepts
in  the  production/operations  area  which  allow  to  exploit  the  simultaneous  potential  of
modern  technologies  (Kaluza,  1996  &  1998).  This  crucial  requirement  can  be  met  by
implementing different forms of team work and networking on the shop floor. A respective
organization  allows  to  reduce  costs  by  extensively  using  a  process  of  continuous
improvement  that  comes  along  with  committed  teams.  Additionally,  this  approach
increases flexibility and quality in the production/operations area providing the company
with a high degree of dynamic differentiation. Finally, decentralized teams can react faster
to changes in demand and needs of internal and external customers. Possible variations of
team work include: flexible machining cells, flexible production segments and the concept
of  lean  management.  Flexible  machining  cells  are  characterized  by  a  heterogeneous
machinery  equipment.  The  resulting  wide  range  of  different  operations  that  may  be
performed in a single cell allow the team to produce entire components rather than single
parts  of  a  product.  Consequently,  the  team  acts  relatively  autonomous  within  the
boundaries  of  the  cell.  Team  members  perform  managerial  activities  like  capacity
management and scheduling.
Combining different machine cells with respect to a certain product leads to flexible pro-
duction segments. These segments comprise several stages of the production process of the
respective product. Additionally, each of these  segments  pursues  its  specific  marketing
strategy. Like flexible machine cells, also in flexible production segments team member
are  empowered  to  take  managerial  responsibility,  although  to  a  higher  extent.
Consequently, in many cases flexible production segments are organized as cost or profit
centers with performance responsibility (Wildemann, 1998). Regarding flexibility, benefits
from these two concepts are different. Flexible machine cells provide a higher flexibility
on the shop floor than flexible production segments (Kaluza, 1996). Still, both concepts
simultaneously  influence  the  critical  success  factors  costs,  flexibility,  and  time  in  a
favorable  manner  (Corsten  &  Will,  1995),  thus  supporting  the  Dynamic  Product
Differentiation Strategy.
A concept that goes beyond the two already discussed is lean management (Womack &
Jones & Roos, 1990). This concept strives for the elimination of all waste in the system.
Unlike flexible machine cells and flexible production segments it applies teamwork and
networking to all areas of a company. As a result, it leads to a significant reduction of
hierarchies  and  the  forming  of  cross-functional  networks,  significantly  enhancing  a
company’s flexibility and time advantages (Charan, 1991).
Today’s competitive environment requires companies to extensively use the creative and
flexible potential of its human resources (Kaluza, 1996). Therefore, we assess human re-
sources as a key issue for a successful implementation of the Dynamic Product Differentia-
tion  Strategy.  Teamwork  as  a  concept  which  considers  this  increased  importance  was
already discussed in the previous paragraph. In general teamwork approaches lead to a
shift of responsibility from managers to subordinates. Thus, we now focus on cooperative
leadership  styles  which  encourage  employees  to  take  over  managerial  responsibilities.24
Cooperative leadership leads to an increased self-management  of  employees.  Thus,  the
company-wide demand for managerial and administrative activities decreases, enhancing
a company’s flexibility and responsiveness.
In general, technology, organization, and human resources are highly interdependent con-
cerning their implications on critical success factors. As these relations are of a comple-
mentary nature in most cases synergistic effects can be obtained by integrating these three
major issues during the implementation process of the Dynamic Product Differentiation
Strategy.
5  Conclusion
We started our investigation of the implications of digital convergence on strategic man-
agement with a brief discussion of the concept of digital convergence. The process of con-
vergence was initiated a few years ago by the rapid progress in digital technologies and
has gained increased practical importance since then. However, a clear definition of the
term "convergence" does not exist yet. Common definition range from easily understood to
scientific approaches. Similarly, there is no consent on the major driving forces behind the
process of convergence, although digital technology is widely considered as being the most
important of these forces.
The  following  chapter  represents  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  strategic  implications  of
digital  convergence.  In  order  to  show  the  multiple  effects  of  convergence  on  strategic
management  we  chose  a  three-steps  approach  for  this  analysis.  In  a  first  step  we
investigated the implications on industry structure based on Porter’s concept of structural
analysis of industries. It showed that three of the five competitive forces determining the
profitability  of  an  industry  are  altered  in  an  unfavorable  way  while  two  others  are
influenced indifferently. This shift in the strengths of the five competitive forces leads to
an  overall  increase  of  competition  in  the  INFOCOM  industry  and  a  resulting  lower
profitability. The second step of our analysis aimed at investigating the implications on
critical success factors. For this purpose we chose four major critical success factors: costs,
differentiation, flexibility, and time. In general, we noticed a significant decrease in the
strategic  importance  of  the  traditional  factors  costs  and  differentiation.  The  innovative
success  factors  flexibility  and  time,  however,  have  gained  importance  for  the  strategic
management in converging industries. These implications on major critical success factors
have significant consequences on Porter’s widely used generic strategies. Therefore, in a
third  step  we  explicitly  analyzed  the  implications  of  digital  convergence  on  these
strategies. Porter’s first generic strategy of overall cost leadership is largely undermined by
digital convergence. This is mainly due to the significantly reduced relevance of costs as a
critical success factor. As this strategy is solely based upon this factor, its strategic validity
becomes highly questionable. Also Porter’s alternative strategy of  differentiation  shows
conceptual drawbacks if applied to the dynamic and complex environment of converging
industries. These drawbacks make it virtually impossible for a company to position itself
uniquely in INFOCOM by pursuing the generic strategy of differentiation. Porter’s third
path  towards  long-term  success  is  focus.  As  focus  is  basically  a  derivative  of  the  two
others, their limitations in converging industries also apply to this strategy.25
The reduced effectiveness of Porter’s generic strategies in the INFOCOM industry derives
from two major causes: the postulated trade-off between a low-cost position and differen-
tiation, and the static nature of these strategies. Therefore, we introduced hybrid strategies
as a solution to this dilemma of strategic management in converging industries. Unlike
Porter, these strategies emphasize the gaining a competitive edge by achieving both a low-
cost position and differentiation. They stress the notion of a high profitability accompanied
with this position rather than being "stuck in the middle". Additionally, hybrid strategies
are dynamic concepts as they refer to a period of time rather than a certain point in time.
A  hybrid  strategy  that  seems  to  be  particularly  tailored  to  the  needs  of  strategic
management  in  converging  industries  is  Kaluza’s  Dynamic  Differentiation  Strategy.  It
stresses the notion of  gaining  a  competitive  edge  by  focusing  on  costs,  differentiation,
flexibility, and time simultaneously. Thus, it enables companies to respond to the high
complexity and dynamics of INFOCOM by reacting to changes in customer needs in a fast
and cost effective manner and still providing a high level of quality.
In the following we applied the structural analysis of industries to the Dynamic Product
Differentiation  Strategy  in  order  to  assess  its  effectiveness  in  converging  industries  in
direct comparison to Porter’s generic strategies. Generally, the Dynamic Product Differ-
entiation Strategy provides protection against each of the five competitive forces. It repre-
sents an effective barrier to entry as it creates alternative switching costs for buyers. A
company pursuing this strategy can avoid price battles as it competes mainly on dynamic
differentiation based on flexibility and time. As this form of differentiation is honored by
customers it allows the company to demand reasonable prices without loosing  them  to
substitute products. Finally, it significantly reduces the bargaining power of suppliers and
buyers.  Supplies’  power  decreases  as  switching  costs  are  very  low  due  to  the  modern
manufacturing  and  information  technologies  employed  by  the  Dynamic  Product
Differentiator. Buyer’s bargaining power, however, is reduced by the already mentioned
dynamic differentiation resulting from pursuing this strategy.
Successful implementation of the Dynamic Product Differentiation Strategy requires a se-
ries of operational steps in the areas of technology, organization, and human resources.
Technologies supporting this strategy are modern manufacturing as well as information
and  communication  technologies.  These  technologies  provide  a  high  flexibility  on  the
shop  floor  by  allowing  fast  and  cost-effective  shifts  among  different  products.
Additionally, they significantly reduce lead time in adjacent areas like R&D and so forth.
However,  modern  technologies  need  to  be  accompanied  by  adequate  organizational
concepts.  Recent  approaches  in  this  area  consist  of  various  forms  of  team  work  and
networking  on  the  shop  floor.  These  approaches  significantly  increase  flexibility  and
quality in production/operations. If these concepts are applied to the entire organization in
order  to  eliminate  all  waste  in  the  system  we  talk  about  lean  management.  Finally,
cooperative leadership styles need to be implemented in the area of human resources in
order to encourage employees to take over the necessary managerial responsibilities.
In this paper we showed the effects of digital convergence on the information and commu-
nication  business.  These  effects  mainly  consist  of  a  substantial  alteration  of  the
competitive environment in the form of blurred industry boundaries, increased rivalry, and
a  reduced  relevance  of  traditional  success  factors.  With  the  Dynamic  Product26
Differentiation  Strategy  we  presented  a  strategic  concept  which  enables  companies  to
compete successfully in this altered economic environment.27
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